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Abstract
In this article we provide, from a novel perspective, arguments that support the idea
that, in the wake of Cox’ approach to probability theory, von Neumann’s entropy should
be the natural one in Quantum Mechanics. We also generalize the pertinent reasoning to
more general orthomodular lattices, which reveals the structure of a general non-Boolean
information theory.
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1 Introduction
The problem of characterizing information measures has puzzled people since the very be-
ginning of information theory. As an example, this intriguing character is expressed in the
very origin of the term ‘entropy’ for Shannon’s measure. In Shannon’s words:
My greatest concern was what to call it. I thought of calling it an “infor-
mation”, but the word was overly used, so I decided to call it an “uncertainty”.
When I discussed it with John von Neumann, he had a better idea. Von Neu-
mann told me, “You should call it entropy, for two reasons. In the first place your
uncertainty function has been used in statistical mechanics under that name, so
it already has a name. In the second place, and more important, nobody knows
what entropy really is, so in a debate you will always have an advantage”.[1] (see
also [2], page 35).
This entropic mystery did nothing but grow since the advent of quantum information
theory (QIT) [3], in which von Neumann’s entropy (VNE) plays a significant role (as for
example, in the quantum coding theorem presented in [4, 5]). Of course, von Neumann’s
measure is not ‘alone’: there are many other entropic measures which also play a significant
role in QM and QIT, such as the Tsallis’ [6, 7] and Reny`ı’s [8] entropies, and even more general
ones [9, 10, 11]. This fact led to an important debate about which is the correct information
measure for the quantal realm (see for example [12] and [13]). Many studies attempted to
characterize Shannon’s entropy first [14, 15, 16, 17], but also von Neumann’s [18]. In this
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article, we offer a novel perspective which considers VNE as the natural information measure
for a non-Boolean probability calculus.
Classical information theory (CIT) relies on the notion of probability: as stressed by
Shannon, the probabilistic aspect of the source is at the basis of his seminal work [19]. It
is widely accepted that classical probability theory can be axiomatized using Kolmogorov’s
postulates [20]. But it turns out that there exists another approach to classical probability,
namely, that of R. T. Cox [21, 22]. In Cox’ approach, probabilities are considered as an
inference calculus on a Boolean algebra of propositions: a rational agent, intending to make
inferences using classical logic (wherefrom the Boolean structure emerges), must compute
the plausibility of certain events to occur. It turns out that the only measure of plausibility
compatible with the algebraic symmetries of the Boolean algebra of propositions is —up
to rescaling— equivalent to Kolmogorov’s probability theory [23, 24, 25]. In this way, the
plausibility calculus is considered as a direct extension of classical deduction theory to an
inference theory: the extension of rationality applied to the calculus of plausibility.
In his preliminary works, Cox also conjectured that Shannon’s entropy [21] was the
natural information measure for classical probability distributions. This approach was con-
siderably developed and improved in [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]. In this way, Shannon’s and
Hartley’s entropies have been characterized as the only entropies that can be used for the
purposes of inquiry, in the sense that other entropies will lead to inconsistencies with the
Boolean character of the lattice of assertions [27].
In [30], we presented a derivation of the axioms of non-commutative probabilities in
Quantum Mechanics (QM) by appealing to the non-distributive (non-Boolean) character of
the lattice of projections of the Hilbert space (Cf. Appendix A of this work for elementary
notions of lattice theory). This was done by extending Cox’ approach for the orthomodular
lattice of projection operators to i) the quantal case and ii) more general non-Boolean alge-
bras. In this work we complement the approach by deriving the VNE as the most natural
information measure in the quantum context. As in [30], we extend our results to more
general (atomic) orthomodular lattices. This is done by exploiting the fact that Cox’ deriva-
tion of Shannon’s entropy can be applied to all possible maximal Boolean subalgebras of an
arbitrary atomistic orthomodular lattice. Thus, according to our extension of Cox’ approach
to the non-commutative realm, the VNE and Measurement Entropy (ME) [31, 32, 33] arise
as the most natural information measures.
The results presented in this work pave the way for a new way of conceiving information
theory. While classical probabilities give rise to Shannon’s theory, and thus, lead to CIT,
non-Boolean probabilities give rise to VNE and QIT. Thus, QIT could be conceived as a
non-Boolean generalization of CIT. This opens the door to a new way of exploring physical
theories from the informational point of view, due to the fact that probabilistic theories
more general than the ones appearing in classical and (standard) quantum mechanics can be
conceived.
Indeed, during the 30’s von Neumann developed a theory of rings of operators [34] (today
known as von Neumann algebras [35, 36]), and subsequently, in a joint work with Murray,
they provided a classification of factors [37, 38, 39, 40]. While quantum systems of finite
degrees of freedom (as is the case for example, in standard non-relativistic QM), can be
described using Type I factors, more general Factors are needed for more general theories:
it can be shown that Type III Factors must be used in relativistic quantum field theory, and
Type II factors may appear in quantum statistical mechanics of infinite systems [41, 35].
Thus, it is expected that theories to be yet developed, such as a quantum theory of gravity,
may very likely imply the use of more general probabilistic models (perhaps not contained
in the above examples).
The more general1 framework for studying probabilistic models up to now is provided by
the Convex Operational Models (COM) approach [44, 45]. In a general probabilistic model,
the probabilities will not be necessarily Kolmogorovian (as is the case for the probabilities
appearing in Type I, II and III factors). Thus, we envisage the development of a non-
Kolmogorovian (or generalized) information theory. A clear example of the fact that such an
1For the case of negative probabilities, see for example [42, 43].
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entity does exists can be found in studies focusing on the validity of informational notions
such as [31, 46, 32, 47] (cf. [45] for more references on the subject). In this work, we
show that CIT and QIT are just particular cases of this approach; the first would be the
Boolean case, and the second, the one represented by the Type I factors of the Murray-von
Neumann classification theory, i.e., as the algebras of bounded operators acting on separable
Hilbert spaces. In this context, it is pertinent to mention that quantum algorithms where
shown to exploit the non-Boolean character of the lattice of projection operators in quantum
mechanics [48]. The generalization of the Bayesian Cox’ approach presented here (and in
[30]), provides a unifying formal framework for dealing with possible physical theories. It
also provides a possible interpretation of VNE and ME as natural measures of information
for non-commutative event structures. In other words, as a natural information measure for
theories exhibiting a highly contextual character, like standard quantum mechanics [49, 50].
Before concluding this Introduction, we remark that an important advantage of extending
the Cox’ approach to non-Boolean settings is that it offers a novel argument in favor of the use
of the logarithmic functional form appearing in the VNE and the ME. As we have remarked
above, there is a debate around the question of why using the VNE instead of more general
quantum information measures (such as the quantum versions of Re´nyi and Tsallis entropies)
in the quantum realm. Moreover, while the ME was introduced in References [31], [32] and
[33], no conceptual argument is presented there in favor of using that functional form instead
of more general ones (apart from observing that it possesses some of the ‘desired properties’
shared by Shannon’s measure and the VNE). In fact, in Section 4.3 of reference [31], a Re´nyi
functional variant of the ME is considered as another possible alternative for the purpose
of studying quantum key encryption protocols. In other words, previous approaches do not
focus in giving reasons for singularizing the VNE and the ME amongst other possibly useful
choices. In this paper we show that in the framework of a rational agent looking for a
measure of the questions unanswered by a particular probability assignment in a contextual
probabilistic model, the VNE and more generally, the ME, appear as the most rational
choices. From this ‘contextual rational agent ’ perspective, the functional forms appearing in
the VNE and the ME can be considered as the most reasonable choices compatible with the
algebraic structure of a contextual inquiry calculus. Notice that this approach also allows for
a very intuitive interpretation of the VNE and the ME, which was not present in previous
works.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we start by reviewing classical probability
theory (in the approaches of Kolmogorov and Cox) and probabilities appearing in QM, em-
phasizing the differences with the classical case. In Section 3 we present a digression on Cox’
[22] and more recent [25] derivations of Shannon’s entropy as natural information measures
for Boolean algebras. Next, in Section 4, we show how VNE arises as a natural measure of
information for the Hilbertian projection lattice. In Section 5, we discuss generalized proba-
bilistic models and ME. Finally, in Section 6 we draw some conclusions. Elementary notions
of lattice theory can be found in Appendix A.
2 Axioms For Probability Theory
2.1 Kolmogorov’s axiomatization of classical probability
Let Σ represent a sigma-algebra of subsets of a given outcome set. To fix ideas, consider the
example of a dice. For this case, the outcome set Ω = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} is the set of all possible
results, and Σ = P(Ω) is the set of all possible subsets of Ω; each element of Σ represents a
possible event (for example, the event “the result is even”, is represented by the set {2, 4, 6}
and so on). Kolmogorov’s axioms can be presented in the form of conditions on a measure
µ over Σ as follows [20]:
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µ : Σ→ [0, 1]
which satisfies
µ(∅) = 0
µ(Ac) = 1− µ(A), (1)
where (. . .)c stands for the set-theoretical complement.
For any pairwise disjoint denumerable family{Ai}i∈I ,
µ(
⋃
i∈I Ai) =
∑
i µ(Ai).
With this minimal axiomatic basis the whole building of classical probability theory can
be erected.
A random variable is defined as a function X : Σ −→ R that assigns real values to
the elements of Σ. Random variables are intended to describe properties of the system
under study that depend on the different possible outcomes that may result from a given
experiment. A random variable may be discrete if its set of possible values is countable, or
continuous if there exists a continuous function which determines its probability distribution
according to
P (X ⊆ B) =
∫
B
f(x) dx (2)
Although not necessarily, the formalization of probability given by Kolmogorov’s axioms
is usually associated with an objectivist (of frequentist) interpretation of probability theory,
in which probabilities represent a property of the system under study, and are therefore
capable of being subject to experimental test.
2.2 Cox’ approach to classical probability
Alternatively, in Cox’ approach probabilities are interpreted in a subjective manner: they do
not represent properties of physical systems, but rather they are related to the information
one possesses about them. The aim of Cox was to establish probability theory as a form
of induction arising as an extension of classical logic to situations of incomplete knowledge.
As it will be shown, by doing so, Cox arrives at the same results as the ones obtained from
Kolmogorov’s axioms. However, these two approaches significantly differ at the conceptual
level. In this section, although we will follow Cox’ original deductions (presented in [21, 22]),
for the sake of clarity, we will somewhat change Cox’ notation. In [51] and [52], a more
detailed discussion on Cox’ work, together with implications and criticisms, can be found.
Let us call P the set of propositions that a rational agent uses to describe a system under
study and “¬”, “∨” and “∧”, the logical negation, disjunction, and conjunction, respectively.
Cox starts by postulating the existence of a function ϕh : P −→ R that represents the
plausibility of the propositions in P on the basis of a special knowledge possessed by the
agent. Such knowledge is that of a proposition, called h (usually called hypothesis), that i)
happens to be true and ii) satisfies:
• ∀a ∈ P, ϕh(¬a) = f(ϕh(a)), for some function f : P −→ R.
• ∀a, b ∈ P, ϕh(a ∨ b) = g[ϕh(a), ϕh(b)], for some function g : P×P −→ R.
It is now possible to derive the calculus of probabilities by imposing on this structure the
symmetries of a Boolean algebra 2. On such a basis one arrives at results analogous to the
ones obtained from Kolmogorov’s axioms.
2By classical logic one refers to the propositional calculus endowed with the operations “¬”, “∨” and “∧”. It
is widely known that the algebraic structures corresponding to this propositional calculus are closely related to
Boolean algebras.
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By imposing coherence of the function ϕh(·) with the associativity of conjunction (a∧(b∧
c) = (a ∧ b) ∧ c)), Cox showed that the function g(x, y) must satisfy the functional equation
g[x, g(y, z)] = g[g(x, y), z] (3)
Using the theory developed in [15], it can be shown that after a re-scaling and a proper
definition of the probability P (a|h) in terms of ϕh(a), this equation’s solutions lead to the
product rule of probability theory
P (a ∧ b|h) = CP (a|h ∧ b)P (b|h) (4)
where C is a constant. The definition of P (a|h) in terms of ϕ(a|h) is omitted, as in actual
computations one ends up using only the function P (a|h) and never ϕ(a|h). On the other
hand, imposing coherence with i) the law of double negation (¬¬a = a) and ii) Morgan’s
law for disjunction (¬(a ∨ b) = ¬a∧ ¬b), Cox arrives to a functional equation for f(·) which
has solutions in terms of P (a|h) given (up to re-scaling) by
P (a|h)r + P (¬a|h)r = 1 (5)
This seemingly arbitrary choice of value for the constant r can be avoided via re-scaling
probability to absorb the r exponent. That is to say, it can be avoided by defining probability
as P ′(a|h) ≡ P r(a|h) instead of P (a|h). Cox decides to take r = 1 and thus he obtains the
usual rule for computing the probabilities of complementary outcomes. Finally, using results
(4) and (5), and imposing coherence with i) the law of double negation and ii) Morgan’s law
for conjunction (¬(a ∧ b) = ¬a ∨ ¬b), Cox deduces the sum rule of probability theory:
P (a ∨ b|h) = P (a|h) + P (b|h)− P (a ∧ b|h) (6)
It can be easily shown from equations (4) and (6) that, if normalized to 1, P (a|h) satisfies
all the properties of a Kolmogorovian probability (equations 1).
2.3 Axioms for probabilities in quantum mechanics
In [53] R. P. Feynman defines probabilities as follows:
I should say, that in spite of the implication of the title of this talk the concept of
probability is not altered in quantum mechanics. When I say the probability of a
certain outcome of an experiment is p, I mean the conventional thing, that is, if
the experiment one expects that the fraction of those which give the outcome in
question is roughly p. I will not be at all concerned with analyzing or defining this
concept in more detail, for no departure of the concept used in classical statistics
is required.
What is changed, and changed radically, is the method of calculating probabilities.
Feynman asserts that while the concept of probability is not altered in QM, the method
of calculating probabilities changes radically. What does this mean? In order to clarify, let
us write down things in a more technical way. To begin with, a general state in QM can be
represented by a density operator, i.e., a trace class positive hermitian operator of trace one
[54, 55]. Let P(H) be the orthomodular lattice of projection operators of a Hilbert space
H (cf. App. A). Due to the spectral theorem, every physical event (i.e., the outcome of
any conceivable experiment), can be represented as a projection operator in P(H). If P is
a projection representing an event and the state of the system is represented by the density
operator ρ, then, the probability pρ(P ) that the event P occurs is given by the formula
pρ(P ) = tr(ρP ) (7)
which is known as Born’s rule [55]. Given an event P and state ρ, if the experiment is repeated
many times, Born’s rule assigns a number which coincides with the fraction mentioned in
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Feynman’s quotation. Gleason’s theorem [56] ensures that density operators are in bijective
correspondence with measures s of the form
s : P(H)→ [0, 1]
such that
s(0) = 0 (0 is the null subspace).
s(P⊥) = 1− s(P ), (8)
and, for a denumerable
and pairwise orthogonal family of projections Pj
s(
∑
j Pj) =
∑
j s(Pj).
Thus, given a state ρ, a measure sρ satisfying Eqns. 8 is uniquely determined in such a
way that, for each outcome of each experiment represented by a projection operator P , it
coincides with the probability defined in Feynman’s quotation. In this way, probabilities
appearing in QM (which are governed by the density matrix and the Born’s rule), can be
axiomatized using Eqs. 8. How is all of this related with the above Feynman’s quotation?
What is the technical meaning of the radical difference mentioned by Feynman? While
Eqs. 8 may look unfamiliar, it is instructive to consider a quantum probability distribution,
such as s, as a collection of classical probability distributions. Let us make some important
definitions in order to see how this works. Let E := {Pi}i∈N be a collection of projections
such that
∨
i Pi = 1H and Pi⊥Pj = 0 whenever i 6= j. We call E an experiment. The
intuitive idea of an experiment refers to the set of events defined by a concrete experimental
setup. Each one of these events is in a bijective correspondence with a possible measurement
outcome. Thus, the E’s can be regarded as part of an outcome set ΩE . As an example,
measuring the spin of a particle in a definite direction defines an experiment. To measure
it in another direction, defines a new experiment incompatible with the first one. Notice
that any experiment defines a maximal Boolean subalgebra of P(H), which is isomorphic to
P(ΩE). The state of the system defines a classical probability distribution on this Boolean
subalgebra, satisfying Eqs. 1.
We call an orthonormal complete set of projectors of the form {|ϕi〉〈ϕi|}i∈N in H (where
the |ϕi〉 are unit vectors) a frame. Notice that any frame is also an experiment. In a sense, a
frame represents a maximal experiment on the system, in the sense that it cannot be refined
by any finer measurement (cfr. [57], Chapter 2). We call FH to the set of all possible frames
in H. Frames are irreducible experiments, in the sense that no outcome is degenerate.
Each experiment E defines a maximal Boolean subalgebra BE ⊂ P(H) 3. Again, if we
restrict the state ρ to BE , we obtain a measure ρBE on BE satisfying Kolmogorov’s probability
theory (defined by Eqns. 1).
Indeed, if we restrict to frames, for each orthonormal basis {|φi〉}i∈N of H representing
a particular irreducible experiment, the state ρ assigns to it a classical probability distri-
bution represented by the vector (p|φ1〉, p|φ2〉, . . .), where p|φi〉 = tr(ρ|φi〉〈φi|). Indeed, the
set {|φi〉〈φi|}i∈N generates a maximal Boolean algebra, and measure sρ defines a classical
probability measure on it just as in 1. Thus, the quantum probabilities originated in a given
state can be considered as a (non-denumerable) family
3The construction of BE is trivial: it is indeed the smallest Boolean subalgebra of P(H) containing E.
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{(p|φ1〉, p|φ2〉, p|φ3〉, . . . . . .)}
{(p|φ′
1
〉, p|φ′
2
〉, p|φ′
3
〉, . . . . . .)}
{(p|φ′′
1
〉, p|φ′′
2
〉, p|φ′′
3
〉, . . . . . .)}
...
...
(9)
where |φi〉, |φ′i〉, etc., ranges over all possible orthonormal basis of H.
Thus, a quantum state can be seen as a collection of classical probability distributions
ranging over each possible experiment. Since in QM different experiments can be incom-
patible (i.e., some of them cannot be simultaneously performed), a quantum state does not
determine a single classical probability distribution: due to Gleason’s theorem, this fact is
correctly axiomatized by Eqs. 8. We thus see how the meaning of the expression “radically
changed” in Feynman’s quote can be expressed in a clear technical (but also conceptual)
sense. In classical probability theory the rational agent is confronted with an event structure
represented by a single Boolean algebra (only one context). This is the content of Cox’ ap-
proach to probability theory 4: the Boolean structure of propositions representing classical
events determine the possible measures of degrees of belief. In other words, if the agent
wants to avoid inconsistencies, he must compute probabilities according to rules compatible
with the Boolean structure of classical logic.
In the quantum realm, due to the existence of complementary contexts, a single Boolean
algebra is no longer sufficient to cogently (and fully) describe physical phenomena, and thus,
the orthomodular structure of P(H) emerges. This is the case for more general theories as
well, such as algebraic relativistic quantum field theory or quantum mechanics with infinitely
many degrees of freedom, and this involves the use of more general algebraic structures (more
on this in the next Section). Notice that these considerations do not imply that classical
logic should be abandoned; quite on the contrary, the experimenter is always confronted
with concrete experiments for which a Boolean algebra is perfectly defined. But no a priori
principle grants that the complete description of all possible phenomena will be exhausted
within a single Boolean context. Here we encounter the radical difference in computing
probabilities that quantum mechanics forces on us: non-Boolean event structures do appear
in nature, and in this case, new rules for computing probabilities must be invoked. In [30]
Cox’ construction is generalized by showing that when the experimenter is confronted with
events represented by a non-Boolean algebra such as P(H), the plausibility measures must
obey Eqns. 8 in order to avoid inconsistencies.
2.4 General case
Measures in lattices more general than the sigma-algebra of the classical case and P(H) can
be constructed [35, 36]. They can be axiomatized as conditions on a measure s as follows:
s : L → [0; 1],
(L standing for the lattice of all events)
such that
s(0) = 0.
s(E⊥) = 1− s(E), (10)
and, for a denumerable and pairwise orthogonal family of eventsEj
s(
∑
j Ej) =
∑
j s(Ej).
4It is also the content of other similar approaches as well, such as the ones presented in Section II of [58]
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See [61] regarding the conditions for the existence of such measures. Eqs. 1 and 8 are just
particular cases of this general approach. There do exist concrete examples of measures on
lattices, coming from Type II and Type III factors, which do not reduce to 1 and 8 [35, 41].
Define an experiment as a set of propositionsA := {ai}i∈N, such that ai ⊥ aj for i 6= j and∨
i ai = 1. Call E to the set of all possible experiments. A frame in L will be an orthogonal
set {ai}i∈N of atoms such that
∨
i ai = 1. Notice that frames are also experiments here.
3 Cox’ Approach and Information Measures
Given an event structure (i.e, a set of propositions referring to events) represented by an
atomic Boolean lattice B, Cox defines a question as the set of assertions that answer it. If a
proposition x ∈ B answers question Q (notice that according to Cox’ definition this means
x ∈ Q), and if y implies x (or in lattice theoretical notation: y ≤ x), then, y should also
answer Q (and thus, y ∈ Q). Any set of propositions in B with this property will be called
a down-set (see [25]). Thus, any question Q in the set of questions Q(B) defined by B is a
down-set. Q(B) forms a lattice with set theoretical inclusion as partial order, intersection
as conjunction and set union as disjunction. Notwithstanding, Q(B) will fail to be Boolean,
due to the failure of orthocomplementation.
Following [59], define an ideal I of a lattice L as a non-empty subset satisfying the
following conditions
• If x ≤ y and y ∈ I, then x ∈ I.
• If x, y ∈ I, then x ∨ y ∈ I.
Thus, any ideal is also a down-set. Given an element a ∈ L, a set of the form I(a) = {x ∈
L | x ≤ a} is an ideal, and it is called a principal ideal of L. An important theorem due to
Birkhoff [59] asserts that the set Lˆ of all ideals forms a lattice and the set Lˆp of all principal
ideals forms a sublattice, which is isomorphic to L [59] (and we denote this fact by Lˆp ∼ L).
For an arbitrary atomic Boolean algebra B, any a ∈ B can be written in the form
a =
∨
i ai, for some atoms ai
5. We can also form the lattices of ideals Bˆ and Bˆp, with Bˆp ⊆ Bˆ
and Bˆp ∼ B (as lattices).
We can also form the lattice of questions Q(B) (which will not be necessarily suitably
orthocomplemented). Notice that while each ideal in B belongs to Q(B), not every element
in Q(B) is an ideal (because a system of assertions does not necessarily satisfy the join
condition of the definition of ideal [28]). Thus, in order to stress the difference, let us call
Qˆ(B) to the set of ideal-questions (i.e., questions such that are represented by ideals of B).
It should be clear that Qˆ(B) ⊆ Q(B). For any question Q ∈ Q(B), if a ∈ Q, then, the ideal
I(a) of a in B satisfies I(a) ⊆ Q (because Q must contain all the x such that x ≤ a). From
this, it follows that Q =
⋃
a∈Q I(a).
One more step is needed in order to guarantee that our questions be real. A real question
must satisfy the condition of being answerable by a true statement [25]. This is elegantly
done by requiring that all atoms must belong to a question in order to be considered real.
Thus, let R(B) be the set if real questions. It can be shown that in the general case, RB will
not be Boolean because of the failure of orthocomplementation. We will not use this lattice
here, but only consider Q(B) and Qˆ(B).
There exists a quantity analogous to probability, called relevance [25], which quantifies
the degree to which one question answers another (the technical details of the construction
of the relevance function are similar to those presented in Section 2.2). Relevance is not only
a natural generalization of information theory, but also forms its foundation [25]. Let us
5Notice that maximal Boolean subalgebras of P(H) satisfy these conditions and that the disjunction may be
infinite but denumerable.
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repeat that the vocable relevance refers to the computation of to what an extent a question
answers another one. From the mathematical point of view, this task is completely analogous
to that of assigning plausibility to B, but applied now to Q(B). As explained in [25], in order
to assign relevances, i) the algebraic properties of the question lattice Q(B) and ii) the
probability assigned to B using Cox’ method must be taken into account. The objective is
thus to assign relevances to the ideal-questions (the rest can be computed using the inquiry
calculus derived using Cox’ method, see Knuth [25]). With the question algebra well-defined,
Knuth extends the ordering relation to a quantity that describes the degree to which one
question answers another. This is done by defining a bi-valuation on the lattice that takes two
questions and returns a real number d ∈ [0, c], where c is the maximal relevance. Precisely,
Knuth calls this bi-valuation the relevance [25]. This procedure can be applied to Q(B) and
Qˆ(B), and thus we have a function d(·|·) with properties analogous to that of a plausibility
function, but now defined on the lattices of questions.
Following [25], we assume that the extent to which the top question 1ˆ answers a join-
irreducible question I(ai) depends only on the probability of the assertion ai from which the
question I(ai) was generated. More abstractly, d(I(ai)|1ˆ) = H(p(ai)|1), H being a function
to be determined in such a way that it satisfies compatibility with the algebraic properties
of the lattice and the probabilities assigned in B (by using Cox’ method). Now, let us review
the properties of d(·|·) according to Knuth’ inquiry calculus. First, we will have subadditivity
d(a ∨ b|c) ≤ d(a|c) + d(b|c) (11)
which is a straightforward consequence of the sigma-additivity condition
d(
∨
i
xi|c) =
∑
i
d(xi|c) (12)
for pairwise disjoint questions {xi}i∈N. Commutativity of “∨” implies that
d(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn|c) = d(xpi(1) ∨ xpi(2), . . . ∨ xpi(n)|c) (13)
for any permutation pi. Now suppose that to a certain collection of questions {x1, x2, . . . , xn}
we add a new question y = I(x) and that we know in advance that the assertion x is false.
Then, y collapses to 0ˆ ∈ Q(B). Thus, we should have the expansibility condition
d(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn ∨ y|c) = d(x1 ∨ x2 ∨ . . . ∨ xn|c) (14)
Suppose now that a question X in Q(B) can be written as X =
∨
i I(ai), where the {I(ai)}
are ideal questions with I(ai) ∧ I(aj) = 0ˆ. Then, we will have
d(
∨
i
I(ai)|1ˆ) =
∑
i
d(
∨
i
I(ai)|1ˆ) =
∑
i
H(p(ai)|1). (15)
Let us cast the above equation as
d(
∨
i
I(ai)|1ˆ) = K(p(ai)), (16)
where we have introduced the function K(p(ai)) which depends on the p(ai) only. If the
{I(ai)} form a finite set (of n elements), we can write K(p(ai)) = Kn(p(a1), . . . , p(an)). It
turns out that Kn(p(a1), . . . , p(an)) satisfies subadditivity, additivity, symmetry and expan-
sibility. A well known result [14, 25] implies that
Kn(p(a1), . . . , p(an)) = AHn(p(a1), . . . , p(an)) +BH
0
n(p(a1), . . . , p(an)), (17)
where A and B are arbitrary constants, Hn(p1, . . . , pn) = −
∑n
i=1 pi ln pi and H
0
n = ln(n)
are the Shannon and Hartley entropies respectively. For information theoretical purposes
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related to the continuity of the measure of information [14, 25], it is very natural to set
A = 1 and B = 0, and thus Kn(p(a1), . . . , p(an)) = −
∑n
i=1 p(ai) ln p(ai). When the terms
{I(ai)} in the decomposition are an infinite denumerable set, by continuity, we will have
that K(p(ai)) = −
∑∞
i=1 p(ai) ln p(ai). The discussion in this Section allows us to discard
the restriction to finite Boolean algebras and turn to more general ones.
4 Von Neumann’s Entropy As A Natural Measure For
P(H)
As was done in the Cox approach to the Boolean case in order to justify the use of Shannon
measure, we look now for a natural information measure for P(H), i.e., a function depending
on the non-commutative measure defined by Eqns. 8. In other words, by appealing to
Gleason’s theorem, we look for a function S(ρ) (depending only on the state ρ), and at the
same time compatible with the algebraic structure of P(H). Notice that it is not a priori
obvious whether a variant of Cox method can be applied to the non-Boolean structure of
P(H) and used to justify the choice of the VNE. In this Section we will see that, according
to Cox approach, the VNE appears as the most rational choice.
Let us callBP(H) to the set of all maximal Boolean lattices of P(H). For each B ∈ BP(H),
we can consider its dual lattice of ideals Bˆ.
Notice that when H is finite dimensional, its maximal Boolean subalgebras will be finite.
As an example, consider P(C2), i.e., the set of all possible linear subspaces of a two dimen-
sional complex Hilbert space. Then, each maximal Boolean subalgebra will be of the form
{0,P,¬P⊥,1C2}, with P = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| for some unit norm vector |ϕ〉 and P
⊥ = |ϕ⊥〉〈ϕ⊥| (with
〈ϕ|ϕ⊥〉 = 0). In a similar way, for P(C3), a maximal Boolean subalgebra will be isomorphic
to P({a,b,c}) = {∅, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a,b}, {a,c},
{b,c}, {a,b,c}}. More specifically, for this last example, given three orthogonal rays in C3
represented by unitary vectors |ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉 and |ϕ3〉, the set {0,P1,P2,P3,P12,P13,P23,1C3},
where Pi = |ϕi〉〈ϕi| (i = 1, 2, 3) and Pij = |ϕi〉〈ϕi| + |ϕj〉〈ϕj | (i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j), forms a
maximal Boolean subalgebra (and all maximal Boolean subalgebras are of this form). No-
tice that in these examples, the sets of atoms {|ϕ1〉〈ϕ1|; |ϕ2〉〈ϕ2|; |ϕ3〉〈ϕ3|} (with orthonormal
|ϕi〉〈ϕi| for all i) and {|ϕ〉〈ϕ|; |ϕ⊥〉〈ϕ⊥|} i) form frames, and ii) generate the above mentioned
Boolean subalgebras of P(H).
Now, it is important to notice that if we restrict a state ρ to B, we will have a classical
probability measure such as the one defined by Eqns. 1, and a concomitant inquiry set Q(B)
can be defined as in [22, 23] (see Section 3 of this work). In what follows, our strategy
will be to construct a suitable information measure, just as we did in Section 3, for each
maximal Boolean subalgebra of P(H). For each frame F = {|ϕi〉〈ϕi|}i∈N ⊂ B representing a
complete experiment, state ρ assigns probabilities pi = tr(ρ|ϕi〉〈ϕi|) to each possible outcome
of F . By following Cox’ spirit [22, 23, 26] and the procedure sketched in Section 3, we can
guarantee (by choosing suitable coefficients A and B in Eqn. 17) that for each maximal
Boolean subalgebra B there exists a canonical information measure HF (ρ) such that for each
frame F ⊆ B:
HF (ρ) = −
∑
i
pi ln pi =
−
∑
i
tr(ρ|ϕi〉〈ϕi|) ln(tr(ρ|ϕi〉〈ϕi|)). (18)
The above construction can be carried out for any B ∈ BP(H). Thus, for any ρ, each
B ∈ BP(H) and each frame F ⊆ B, we have a measure HF (ρ). It is important to note that
this family of measures, although only defined on the maximal boolean sublattices, do cover
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the whole P(H) lattice. This is so because, as shown in [60], every orthomodular lattice is
the union of its maximal boolean sublattices.
Our point is that we need a measure such that it depends only on ρ and not on the
particular choice of complete experiment (represented by a particular frame). Among the
family of measures HF (ρ), it is natural (according to Cox approach) to take the one which
attains the minimum value: the one with the least Shannon’s information (i.e., we are looking
for the frame in which the information is maximal). This means that it is natural to define
H(ρ) := inf
F∈FH
HF (ρ). (19)
Given that ρ is self adjoint, let us consider its set of eigenprojectors Fρ = {|ρi〉〈ρi|}i∈N,
with ρi ∈ R satisfying ρ|ρi〉 = ρi|ρi〉 and ρ =
∑
ρi|ρi〉〈ρi|. It should be clear that if ρ is
non-degenerate, Fρ is a frame. If ρ is degenerate, it is equally easy to find a frame out of
its eigenprojections. Accordingly, without loss of generality we can suppose that ρ defines a
frame. Now consider the maximal Boolean algebra BFρ generated by Fρ. Using Eq. 18, it
follows that the canonical measure H , when restricted to Fρ satisfies
HFρ(ρ) = −
∑
i tr(ρ|ρi〉〈ρi|) ln(tr(ρ|ρi〉〈ρi|)) =
−
∑
i ρi ln ρi = −tr(ρ ln(ρ)) (20)
which is nothing but the VNE. But the VNE has the well known property of attaining its
minimum value at Fρ (cf. Reference [2]):
− tr(ρ ln(ρ)) ≤ HF (ρ), ∀ F ∈ FH (21)
Thus, we have shown that H(ρ) = −tr(ρ ln(ρ)). In other words, von Neumann’s entropy
is the only function which emerges canonically as the minimum of all measures compatible
with the algebraic structure of P(H). Notice that we are deriving VNE out of the algebraic
symmetries of the lattice. The above considerations show the VNE as a natural measure of
information of P(H), as a consequence of Shannon’s entropy being the natural information
measure of a Boolean algebra following Cox’ method. Notice that our derivation covers both
the finite and infinite dimensional cases.
5 Generalized Probabilistic Models
After deriving the VNE using the Cox method, we now advance a step further and investigate
whether this procedure can be extended to more general contextual theories. Concretely, we
now briefly discuss what happens if L is an arbitrary atomic orthomodular lattice and µ is
a measure obeying Eqs. 10. We show that the procedure of the previous Section can be
extended to this case. Let BL be the set of all possible maximal Boolean subalgebras of L.
For each B ∈ BL, the Cox’ construction applies as in Section 3, and we have a Shannon’s
function HF(µ) defined for each frame F = {ai}i∈N ∈ E (see Section 2.4):
HF(µ) = −
∑
ai∈A
µ(ai) ln(µ(ai)), (22)
As in the previous Section, we define:
H(µ) := inf
F∈E
HF(µ). (23)
Notice that when restricted to frames, HA(µ) coincides with the Shannon’s measures derived
using Cox’ method. Thus, by construction, H(µ) does the job of representing the canonical
measure of information, as Shannon’s and VNE did in the classical and quantum cases,
respectively.
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The results of this Section show that it is indeed possible to generalize Cox’ method to
probabilistic theories more general than a Boolean algebra. Notice that, when L is a Boolean
algebra, we recover Cox’ construction, and when L = P(H), we recover our construction for
the VNE. Indeed, by looking at Eq. 23, the reader will soon recognize that our derivation
coincides with the measurement entropy (ME) introduced in [31, 32, 33]. The main difference
of our approach with the one of these references is that: i) we derive the same measures by
using Cox approach, and thus, we provide a novel intuitive interpretation for them; and ii)
by means of our derivation, we discard other possible functional forms, such as the ones
appearing in Tsallis or Re´nyi entropies, justifying in this way the usage of the logarithmic
form of the VNE and the ME.
6 Conclusions
If a rational agent deals with a Boolean algebra of assertions, representing physical events, a
plausibility calculus can be derived in such a way that the plausibility function yields a theory
which is formally equivalent to that of Kolmogorov for classical probabilities [21, 22, 29, 25].
A similar result holds if the rational agent deals with an atomic orthomodular lattice [30],
as is the case with the contextual character of the lattice of projections representing events
of a quantum system. For the later case, non-Kolmogorovian probabilities (Eqs. 8) arise
as the only ones compatible with the non-commutative (non-Boolean) character of quantum
complementarity.
In Cox’ approach, Shannon’s information measure relies on the axiomatic structure of
Kolmogorovian probability theory. We have shown in Section 4 that, according to our
extension of Cox’ method, the VNE emerges as its non-commutative version. The VNE thus
arises as a natural measure of information derived from the non-Boolean character of the
underlying lattice P(H). The different entropies discussed in this work are summarized in
Table 1.
The fact that this kind of construction can be extended to more general probabilistic
models (as we have shown in Section 5, where we have deduced the ME as a natural measure
of information), implies that CIT and QIT can be considered as particular cases of a more
general non-commutative information theory.
These results allow for an interpretation of the VNE and measurement entropy as the
natural measures of information for an experimenter who deals with a non-Boolean (contex-
tual) event structure. This is the case for standard quantum mechanics, in which quantum
complementarity expresses itself in the existence of non-compatible measurement set-ups
and, consequently, in the different contexts of P(H) (maximal Boolean subalgebras) and
non-commutative observables.
Classical Quantum General
Lattice P(Γ) P(H) L
Entropy −
∑
i p(i) ln(p(i)) −trρ ln(ρ) infF∈EHF(µ)
Table 1: Table comparing the differences between the classical, quantal, and general cases.
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Lattices
• A lattice L is a partially ordered set (i.e., a set endowed with a partial order relationship
“≤”) such that for very a, b ∈ L there exists a unique supremum, the least upper bound
“a∨ b” called their join, and an infimum, the greatest lower bound “a∧ b” called their
meet.
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• A bounded lattice has a greatest and least element, denoted 1 and 0 (also called top
and bottom, respectively).
• For any lattice, an orthocomplementation is a unary operation “¬(. . .)” satisfying:
¬(¬(a)) = a (24a)
a ≤ b −→ ¬b ≤ ¬a (24b)
a ∨ ¬a and a ∧ ¬a exist and
a ∨ ¬a = 1 (24c)
a ∧ ¬a = 0 (24d)
hold.
• If L has a null element 0, then an element x of L is an atom if 0 < x and there exists
no element y of L such that 0 < y < x. L is Atomic, if for every nonzero element x of
L, there exists an atom a of L such that a ≤ x.
• A modular lattice is one that satisfies the modular law x ≤ b implies x ∨ (a ∧ b) =
(x∨ a)∧ b, where ≤ is the partial order, and ∨ and ∧ (join and meet, respectively) are
the operations of the lattice. An orthomodular lattice is an orthocomplemented lattice
satisfying the orthomodular law: a ≤ b and ¬a ≤ c implies a∨ (b∧ c) = (a∨ b)∧ (a∨ c).
• Distributive lattices are lattices for which the operations of join and meet are distribu-
tive over each other. Distributive orthocomplemented lattices are called Boolean. The
collection of subsets of a given set, with set intersection as meet, set union as join and
set complement as orthocomplementation, form a complete bounded lattice which is
also Boolean.
• Any quantum system represented by a separable Hilbert space H has associated a
lattice formed by all its closed subspaces P(H), where 0 is the null subspace, 1 is the
total space H, ∨ is the closure of the direct sum, ∧ is subspace intersection, and ¬(S)
is the orthogonal complement of a subspace S⊥ [36]. This lattice was called “Quantum
Logic” by Birkhoff and von Neumann and it is a modular one if the Hilbert space
is finite dimensional, and orthomodular for the infinite dimensional case. The set of
projection operators on H forms a lattice which is isomorphic to P(H) (and thus, they
can be identified).
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